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Abstract 
 
Disaster warning systems are a form of risk 
communication that allow national, state, and local 
actors to prepare for, respond to, and understand 
disaster risk. The increased use of social media 
platforms to exchange information around disasters 
challenges traditional, centralized forms of risk 
communication. While social media is already used in 
emergency management to some degree, issues of trust 
and reliability of information limit the widespread 
adoption of social media into emergency management 
practices.  This paper offers a case study of the role 
that social media information plays in Puerto Rico’s 
hurricane early warning system and highlights the 
affordances and limitations of decentralized, 
heterarchical communication forms around disasters 
for federal, state, and local-level emergency 
management authorities. The case highlights 
differences in perception of social media information 
around disasters by emergency management 
authorities and by community members both before 
and after Hurricane Maria in 2017. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Lessons from major disaster events of the past 
have highlighted that the capacity of a community to 
reduce risk can be increased with availability of timely 
information exchange, and feedback processes across 
jurisdictions and sectors [23]. Increasingly ubiquitous 
and persistent connectivity, particularly in urban 
centers, means that since the 2010 Haitian Earthquake, 
such informal networks are now commonplace in 
response to disaster, and are especially prevalent in the 
absence of formal information sources showing real-
time hazard information [16][20]. However, during 
major disaster events such as Hurricane Irma and 
Hurricane Maria, research finds that residents do not 
always receive targeted warning when it is needed the 
most due to delays in response, lack of access to 
information or the inability for people to receive timely 
warnings through the appropriate communication 
channels [29]. 
 
Of particular relevance, internet-connected 
smartphones and social media networks catalyze the 
creation of informal networks for communication and 
coordination of information in response to natural 
disasters [23][24][25]. Currently, disaster management 
processes do not routinely facilitate the integration of 
these networks into disaster response activities [25]. 
Further, there are no established protocols for sharing 
time-sensitive data on government/agency response 
activities in machine-readable formats that can be 
readily consumed by social media applications to and 
share these with community networks [12][14]. A 
knowledge gap exists to understand how community 
generated networks can contribute to formal disaster 
management processes, and how in return, response 
agencies can improve processes for capturing 
information generated by community networks for 
disaster management and risk reduction. 
 
Social media networks like Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram are increasingly a 
source of information and news for people worldwide. 
They can be used to convey information during 
disasters to send warnings, to conduct situational 
awareness, and even to catalyze action and sustain 
feedback loops among public authorities, volunteer 
groups, the business sector, and citizens.  The wide 
spectrum of social media platforms and the 
overwhelming volume of content being circulated on 
each platform at any given time make for a “data 
avalanche” that can be challenging for decision makers 
and responders to manage during disasters [40]. 
 
No two social media platforms are the same 
and each attracts its own audience of users and offers 
its own means of communicating information. While 
some platforms allow users to share a combination of 
photographs and text, others may privilege video as the 
main type of content. Some platforms automatically 
tag posts with geospatial information while others do 
not. Houston et. al (2015) have developed a framework 
for social media use in disaster planning, response, and 
research and in so doing have identified fifteen distinct 
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ways in which individuals use social media to talk 
about a disaster incident.  
 
Uses of social media range from providing 
preparedness information before the disaster occurs, to 
sending and receiving requests for assistance during 
the disaster, to helping reconnect community members 
post-disaster. One of the major concerns of relying on 
social media information during a disaster is that of 
propagating misinformation during critical phases of 
disaster response [2] [40] [41]. On the one hand, 
having access to such a large amount of information on 
social media before, during, and after a disaster can be 
advantageous for assessing need, therein lies the 
problem of sifting verifiable, useful information from 
erroneous, misleading information. Regardless, given 
the dearth of information that becomes available on 
social media around disaster incidents, there has been 
much speculation about how social media information 
may be incorporated into disaster warning systems.  
 
Previous research has examined the uses of 
social media during both natural [24] and man-made 
disasters [38] and the degree to which general users of 
social media trust information being produced on 
social media platforms. However, less research has 
been produced about the effect of more decentralized, 
heterarchical risk communication platforms like social 
media on more centralized, hierarchical risk 
communication platforms. There is a need to 
understand to what extent social media information 
augments, challenges, or obfuscates official 
communication channels around disasters. 
 
This paper offers a case study that closely 
examines the role of social media information within 
Puerto Rico’s hurricane early warning system. The 
circumstances under which this study was carried out 
involve a “natural experiment”: Hurricane Maria 
during the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season. The first 
phase of this study involved interviews that 
investigated how disaster managers and community 
members on the island perceived of the use of social 
media before the hurricane, and the second phase of 
the study follows up on whether attitudes changed or 
not after the hurricane. 
 
In making sense of the findings, his paper’s 
principal objectives are to answer the following 
questions: How do perceptions of social media 
information around disasters differ between emergency 
management authorities and community members? Did 
this change after the passage of Hurricane Maria in 
2017? 
 
 
2. Social Media in Early Warning Systems  
 
The purpose of an early warning system 
(“EWS”) is to provide information concerning 
potential natural disasters to decision makers across 
sectors (government, NGOs, private sector, civil 
society, et al.) so that they might work to minimize risk 
to life and property prior to, during, or after the 
manifestation of disasters [50][36][27][22][46][5]. For 
this reason, early warning systems are a key 
component of disaster management; they allow for 
information to reach those who will be affected by 
disaster.  
 
Within a typical early warning system, an actor 
monitors and gathers data about existing conditions; 
sends that data to a central location to be analyzed, 
produces forecasts based on that data; and then sends 
appropriate warnings to decision makers, responders, 
and at-risk populations [49]. In the event of a 
hurricane, for instance, a hydro-meteorological 
authority might use satellites to collect data about 
developing storms; aggregate and analyze the data 
from a common database; produce forecasts about a 
storm’s trajectory and magnitude; and send warnings 
about its potential impacts to decision makers, 
responders, and at-risk populations. Because the 
effectiveness of early warning systems depends upon 
the accuracy of scientific data, existing research often 
characterizes EWS by their technological infrastructure 
and reliance on scientific knowledge [44]. However, a 
more holistic understanding of early warning systems 
must also take into account the fact that EWS are not 
merely technocratic, organizational constructs but also 
social constructs. That is to say, EWS are constituted 
and executed by human actors [18][11]. For instance, a 
hurricane early warning system may consist of 
advanced remote sensing technology and software that 
can predict a storm’s trajectory and magnitude, but it is 
also constituted by the people who manage the 
technology and make decisions based on the data 
produced by the technology. Thus, the effectiveness of 
warning systems depends not only on the technical 
information they are able to provide but also on who 
participates in them. 
 
Social media serves as a source of intelligence and 
local knowledge during disasters, capturing the 
reactions, concerns, and observations of those affected 
by the disaster through text and images. A “humans as 
sensors” approach places even more emphasis on the 
observations of people for data collection [13][51]. 
Viewing social media as a type of warning system 
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during disasters extends the idea that people can be 
sensors of their environments and can convey relevant 
and timely information within communication 
networks when disasters occur. 
 
 
2.1 Hierarchical and heterarchical risk 
communication forms 
 
Traditionally, risk communication constructs such 
as warning systems operate using a hierarchical, one-
way mode of information transfer in which gatekeepers 
selected what information to share with the public [41]. 
Then, risk and crisis communication in the 1960s and 
1970s placed more emphasis on the variable 
perceptions that the public can have about the same 
information, leading to overreaction and mistrust at 
worst. In the 1990s, this unidirectional model of risk 
and crisis communication was criticized and further 
decentralized to make room for multiple means of 
communicating the same information in different ways 
[52]. 
 
Unlike the traditional “one-to-many,” centralized 
model of emergency management communication 
systems, social media allows for “many-to-many,” 
decentralized communication across peer networks 
[26][12]. However, disaster and emergency planning 
still revolves around the conventional unidirectional 
model of information dissemination during disasters 
[41]. Tapia & Moore (2014) argue that disaster 
managers’ critiques of of social media’s reliability, 
verifiability, and trustworthiness are unreasonable. 
Their study finds that disaster managers already 
operate with less-than-reliable information in the field, 
and that emergency managers use social media 
information during response phases from their known 
community and network. Importantly, the study 
concludes firmly that trust first begins with people, not 
data. The barriers to adopting social media into disaster 
management practice are therefore institutional. Other 
research has expressed criticism against the 
inflexibility of disaster managers with regard to 
interfacing with the public to gather information about 
disaster incidents [54][7][29][14]. The distinction 
between hierarchical and heterarchical systems is 
discussed widely in management science and 
organizational theory [23][17][15][3]. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Precedents for social media use during 
disasters and emergencies 
 
Precedents for social media usage around disasters 
exist around the world. At the community and civic 
engagement level, there are examples like the 2007 
southern California wildfires in Malibu, CA, which 
blazed for nearly twenty days across the region. 
Affected communities used social media platforms like 
mobile phones, photo sharing services like Flickr or 
Picasa, and Twitter as a backchannel for 
communicating with each other [41]. Chatfield & 
Brajawidagda (2007) observe networks of people and 
organizations on Twitter who served as official and 
unofficial warning systems for a potential tsunami in 
Indonesia. Sakaki, Okazaki, & Matsuo (2010) designed 
and developed a method for using tweets as earthquake 
early warning systems in Japan. During a recent terror 
attack in Manchester, UK, local residents of the 
affected city used the Twitter hashtag 
#RoomForManchester in posts to indicate open rooms 
and shelters where affected individuals could stay in 
the short-term (Horton, 2017). At the level of decision 
makers and responders, there are examples like 
TweeTracker and CrisisTracker, tools designed to help 
first responders gain situational awareness of disasters 
from realtime tweets with the aid of data mining tools 
[20] [33]. PetaBencana is a platform for emergency 
response and disaster management in megacities in 
South and Southeast Asia. It began as a flood mapping 
platform in Jakarta, Indonesia, which allowed for 
individuals with social media accounts to report 
flooding in various parts of the city. The information 
would be mapped in real-time and made accessible to 
responders. Practitioners and researchers have also 
made a case for social media-based warning systems 
for disease detection, monitoring of outbreaks 
pandemics, and overall health surveillance [25][6].  
 
 
3. Case selection: Puerto Rico & Hurricane 
Maria 
 
The Caribbean region is highly susceptible to 
hurricanes, and islands like Puerto Rico, located within 
the region, are highly susceptible to hurricanes and 
their impacts [48][21]. Given high level of exposure 
and likelihood to hurricanes, an effective warning 
system is necessary to reduce damage to life and 
property. Puerto Rico has dealt with multiple hurricane 
events in the past and thus invests planning efforts into 
managing the risks posed by natural disasters to its 
resources [7][4][33][30]. The last three major 
hurricanes that made landfall on the island before 
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Hurricane Maria caused a total of 17 deaths (direct and 
indirect) and $3.7 billion (USD) in damage to property 
and infrastructure. These hurricanes also passed close 
to San Juan, ultimately affecting the east side of the 
island more than the west side. 
 
Hurricane Maria, a Category 4 storm, swept 
through Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017. With 
maximum wind intensity of 150 knots and storm surge 
up to 9 feet above the ground, it was one of the most 
powerful hurricanes to have ever hit the island [31].  
The death toll is highly uncertain, although the official 
number stands at 65, which includes an unknown 
number of indirect deaths.1 The estimated cost in 
damages to Puerto Rico and the adjacent U.S. Virgin 
Islands hovers around $90 billion USD [37]. The 
power grid was severely damaged, leading to island-
wide blackouts that lasted months after the storm. In 
the immediate days after the hurricane made landfall, 
the extensive power outages also led to 
communications blackouts for those on phone 
networks that did not have backup power for their 
towers and antennae [31]. The blackouts also meant 
that Internet communications were down for an 
extended period of time, further challenging 
communications between people, organizations, and 
governments. 
 
Emergency management authorities at the 
federal, state, and local levels in Puerto Rico are 
trained to employ best practices for hurricane warnings 
through traditional and official communication 
channels (i.e. media briefings, website, emergency 
management services channels). The use of social 
media by community members, media personalities, 
and amateur meteorologists to communicate about 
hurricanes and storms offers a way for people to 
communicate outside of official warning channels.  
 
Social media usage in Puerto Rico has grown 
significantly over the years alongside mobile phone 
usage. A 2016 study from Estudios Tecnicos, an 
economic planning and consulting firm on the island, 
finds that nine out of every 10 people in Puerto Rico 
own a cell phone, and 68.2% of cell phones are 
smartphones. Additionally, 94.7% of internet users on 
the island reported that they connect to the internet 
through their phones, accessing social media platforms 
such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and YouTube [9]. 
 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that hundreds of additional indirect 
deaths in Puerto Rico may eventually be attributed to Maria’s 
aftermath pending the results of an official government 
review. 
Those working in emergency management 
have tried a number of strategies to mitigate the spread 
of rumors on social media, especially where social 
media information conflicts with official messaging. At 
the same time, community members express support 
for alternative communication channels like those 
available on social media given that they often reach 
more targeted audiences. Given the tension between 
differential attitudes toward the use of social media for 
risk communication on the island, Puerto Rico 
becomes a unique case to examine to better understand 
social media’s affordances and limitations during 
disasters. 
 
 
3.1. The island context 
 
In addition, small, urbanized islands are cited 
as some of the most disproportionately vulnerable 
places with regard to exposure to natural hazards 
within international policy frameworks that address 
DRR such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction and the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals [1][47][44]. Much has been 
observed about different centralized and decentralized 
risk communication strategies for managing early 
warning information [44]. Yet, existing scholarship 
mostly examines early warning [55][5] without many 
studies of specific islands and their local contexts. It is 
possible that case studies of specific islands can lead to 
best practices and learnings that can be applied to other 
island contexts.  
 
 
4. Methodology  
 
4.1. Semi-structured interviews 
 
Over the course of one year between January 
2017 and January 2018, 64 interviews were undertaken 
with individuals and groups across multiple sectors 
engaged with Puerto Rico’s hurricane early warning 
system. These sectors included government (at federal, 
state, municipal levels), NGOs, universities, 
community organizations, military, media, and 
communities. Individuals were identified and selected 
based on their involvement with the process of 
formulating, disseminating, receiving, and acting upon 
hurricane early warning system information. Other 
interviewees were identified through snowball 
sampling during fieldwork. Of the interviewees, 35% 
were women and 65% were men. Many of the 
interviewees represented government organizations 
such as the National Weather Service, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency. Some represented 
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non-governmental organizations like the Red Cross, 
local media, faith-based and community-based 
organizations. Community members included residents 
of San Juan. 
 
Interviews were not conducted for attribution 
and informants are mainly referred to in the results 
section by their titles and roles as opposed to specific 
names. Ethics approval was obtained through the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology human subjects 
research protocol (COUHES) before the study was 
conducted. 
 
This data collection approach allowed for 
detailed, descriptive accounts of how hurricane early 
warning systems work, as well as “deeper dives” into 
the intersubjective experiences and interpretations of 
those who are affected [9][52]. I conducted some 
interviews in English and other interviews in Spanish 
where interviewees expressed higher level comfort in 
the Spanish language. Interviews typically lasted 
between 20 and 40 minutes and were conducted one-
on-one. In rare instances during which I conducted 
group interviews, I would ask one question at a time, 
then give all interviewees an opportunity to answer the 
same question. The interview instrument was tested 
first with two key informants before being used for 
others. Some interviews were audio recorded, but the 
majority were recorded and transcribed via handwritten 
notes. Importantly, interviews were conducted both 
before and after Hurricane Maria to compare 
perceptions of social media usage during disaster both 
among emergency managers and community members. 
See Appendix for supporting files and interview 
instrument. 
 
4.2. Participant observation 
 
During field work associated with this study, I 
carried out a research fellowship with the Department 
of Natural and Environmental Resources (DNER) in 
Puerto Rico, a state-level government agency in charge 
of, inter alia, the management of natural resources in 
coastal areas. It also oversees the Puerto Rico Climate 
Change Council (PR-CCC), an interdisciplinary group 
of policy makers and researchers concerned with 
climate change adaptation plans on the island.  
 
Being embedded in the field within a 
government office allowed me to gain access to 
interviewees through exposure to the DNER and PR-
CCC’s social network. I also gained access to an 
annual conference called the Caribbean Regional 
Response Team meeting wherein 80 individuals 
representing several federal governmental 
organizations, including the military, involved with 
emergency response to disasters convened to set an 
annual agenda for the team. Through this relationship 
with the DNER, I participated in community planning 
meetings during which the main subject of discussion 
was climate change adaptation, which included 
community strategies for disaster risk reduction at a 
local level. Field notes were taken throughout this 
embedded field work and incorporated into the field 
data collected for this study. This model of “service 
learning” is based on an exchange between a 
researcher and community partner, creating an 
opportunity for researchers to make a local 
contribution while in the field [37][19]. 
 
4.3. Document review 
 
Interviewees from multiple government 
agencies provided me with training materials that 
document Puerto Rico’s early warning preparedness 
and response structures and timelines. I used these 
documents to corroborate findings from field 
interviews, and vice versa, during my analysis of 
Puerto Rico’s early warning system structure. The 
documents included various organizational charts from 
the National Weather Service and Tsunami Warning 
Center in Puerto Rico, which described the flow of 
information during warnings, as well as the leadership 
chain of command during emergencies and disasters.  
 
 
4.4. Analysis approaches and limitations 
 
Audio and notes from all interviews were 
transcribed and translated to English using Microsoft 
Word. An a priori coding scheme was created in which 
interviewees were categorized by sector (e.g. 
“government”) and sector type (e.g. “federal” or 
“state”). Responses for each interview question were 
logged for every interviewee, with these sector 
categories in mind. Then, an emergent coding scheme 
was created to further categorize major themes in the 
responses from interviewees. These coding schemes 
were also used to categorize notes from participant 
observation and document review.  
 
Because the findings of this study are prone to 
intersubjectivity among interviewees and myself, the 
researcher, responses from the interviews were 
corroborated with each other, and follow-up interviews 
over the phone were conducted to clarify details in 
order to triangulate the data collected. Additional 
follow-up interviews with key informants were also 
conducted during April 2017 and January 2018 to 
validate the data collected in initial interviews, to 
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mitigate the potential bias and intersubjectivity of the 
author from having been embedded in the DNER 
during field work, and to  
 
The case study approach to San Juan offers a 
means of producing context-dependent knowledge in 
order to understand what factors influence complex 
events and processes like those that constitute 
hurricane early warning systems. However, the 
external validity of the study may be limited to island 
territories like Puerto Rico and not necessarily 
independent island states. This study was limited to 
San Juan, Puerto Rico, meaning that only the urban 
context was studied and represented. It is important to 
consider that the resources available for early warning 
in San Juan may not be as widely used or accessible in 
non-urban areas where information communications 
technology and infrastructure do not have extensive 
reach. For instance, some interview respondents 
indicated that communities in more rural areas of the 
island sometimes do not rely on television or the 
internet for news coverage. In addition, other groups 
that this study did not successfully reach and represent 
completely include marginalized populations such as 
prisoners and illegal immigrants.  
 
5. Findings 
 
Pre-Hurricane Maria 
 
5.1. Emergency management authorities mitigate 
social media misinformation by being responsive to 
“rumors.” 
 
 Dispelling rumors on social media is often 
one of the biggest weaknesses and challenges for 
“official” early warning actors upstream. The National 
Weather Service actively monitors weather-related 
social media accounts from amateur meteorologists 
who have large followings, but who ultimately do not 
have the final authority to declare when a tropical 
storm is officially a hurricane. In the case where the 
NWS has not officially declared a storm a hurricane, 
and a social media account uses the word “hurricane” 
explicitly in describing an oncoming storm, the NWS 
would use social media to respond to that post with the 
intent of clarifying the official message. 
 
5.2. The National Weather Service provides all 
warnings in English first, then Spanish.  
 
While the NWS does release early warning 
information in both English and Spanish, English is 
usually the primary language used to communicate, 
with Spanish translations following an hour or two 
afterward. Because the National Weather Service field 
office in San Juan, Puerto Rico, is responsible for 
monitoring and communicating with both Puerto Rico 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands (where the primary 
language is English), the warnings originating from the 
San Juan office must be in English first. The Spanish 
translations usually come out at least an hour after the 
English warnings. 
 
5.3. Emergency management authorities recognize a 
need to update risk communication practices to 
encompass new communication platforms. 
 
Many emergency managers who are 
responsible for warnings reported an awareness of the 
growing ubiquity of smartphones and social media. 
Many of the drills for Puerto Rico’s early warning 
system rely on older forms of communication 
technology such as television, radio, phones, and in 
some cases Internet. In interviews, emergency 
managers noted a need to update testing of early 
warnings to be more inclusive of smartphone 
technology to reach more and more people. 
 
5.4. Native Spanish speakers are likely to rely on 
Spanish-language social media accounts for disaster 
information instead of more official channels like 
the National Weather Service. 
 
An overwhelming majority of Puerto Ricans 
speak Spanish (94.5%), and a large majority self-report 
that they speak English “less than ‘very well’” (83.3%) 
according to the 2011-2015 American Community 
Survey. Among residents in San Juan, whose primary 
language is Spanish, local Spanish-language media and 
social outlets are the main source for hurricane 
information as opposed to national media outlets, 
which mainly use English. 
 
Post-Hurricane Maria 
 
5.5. Sustained loss of power during Hurricane 
Maria was unexpected by many in the emergency 
management community.  
 
Many emergency managers responsible for 
risk communication noted that substantial time was 
dedicated to testing equipment and communication 
channels before Hurricane Maria hit. However, the 
power grid failure after the hurricane made landfall 
caused all communications to fail. Additionally, there 
were no clear protocols for dealing with long-term 
power and communications loss. Many emergency 
managers relied on satellite phones and ham radios as a 
backup communication method, but this proved to be 
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only partially effective, as neither functions well with 
too much cloud cover. 
 
5.6. Social media was used by emergency managers 
before Hurricane Maria made landfall to provide 
live updates on the storm’s status. 
 
 The National Weather Service, local media, 
and local meteorologists coordinated news briefings 
and social media messaging before Hurricane Maria 
hit. The objective was to provide a “unified voice” 
among risk communicators to give community 
members accurate updates about the storm. This was 
done in English and Spanish.  
 
5.7. Social media was a faster way for emergency 
managers to translate warnings from English to 
Spanish before and during the storm. 
 
 Referring back to the pre-hurricane finding, 
the National Weather Service releases all warnings in 
English first, then translates them into Spanish through 
all the official NWS communications channels. This 
lag causes many native Spanish speakers to seek their 
news from other sources like Spanish-language social 
media accounts instead. However, for Hurricane Maria, 
the National Weather Service leaned on social media 
as a means of having one dedicated channel on which 
English and Spanish warnings could come out 
somewhat simultaneously. The translations were done 
much more quickly on social media and were able to 
reach people in a timely manner. 
  
 
5.8. Community members reported relying on social 
media to communicate with each other after the 
storm. 
 
 The majority of community members 
interviewed reported using social media to 
communicate with one another whenever it became 
possible to do so. Although power and 
communications were out for up to months after the 
storm, sporadic connectivity allowed community 
members to use each other’s phones to contact family 
members on the island and on the U.S. mainland. In 
some cases, community members reported that it was 
more efficient for them to use social media to contact 
friends or family on the mainland, in order to give 
them instructions about others to contact back in 
Puerto Rico, given the limited and less reliable 
connectivity on-island.  
 
6. Discussion & Conclusions 
 
The role of social media in warning systems 
continues to become more prevalent, and emergency 
managers are finding new ways to integrate 
information on social media into their practices. While 
warning systems are designed to be hierarchical, 
meaning that there is a centralized authority or 
organization in charge of disseminating information to 
actors downstream, social media offers a more 
heterarchical means of communication between peer 
networks. While on the one hand, rumors and 
misinformation might spread through social media’s 
informal networks, these same informal networks can 
provide a channel through which timely information 
can travel even more quickly and reach more people.  
 
The emergency management community 
would benefit from seeking strategies that readily 
incorporate social media into the way that risk 
communicators both get and push out information 
before, during, and after disasters. While this study 
only captures one case, it provides a before and after 
view of how social media is used and perceived by 
emergency managers and community members around 
a significant natural disaster. 
 
This study could be expanded to include other 
island communities to better understand whether 
similar challenges with social media, rumor control, 
and trust are consistent in the island context. 
Particularly in island communities in which different 
languages are spoken, it is important to consider the 
language access gaps in existing hierarchical warning 
systems and whether social media becomes a 
communication tool that circumvents existing language 
barriers.  
 
Islands like Puerto Rico will unfortunately 
continue to experience disasters. Not only are islands 
in the Caribbean, Pacific, and Indian Oceans prone to 
cyclones and hurricanes, but they are also subject to 
other hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, 
volcanoes, sea-level rise, heat waves, droughts, nuclear 
accidents, and terrorism. The way in which warning 
systems are designed for island communities must be 
sensitive to their differential contexts, especially where 
language and culture can mean the difference between 
life and death. 
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